Dr James Gomez of the Asia Centre says ASEAN unity is fraying, China is being sidelined, and Southeast Asian economies face a convergence of inflation, supply disruption and narrowing diplomatic room as the conflict widens.
KUALA LUMPUR, Mar 4 – As US and Israeli military operations against Iranian targets enter their fifth day, with President Donald Trump suggesting the campaign could last four to five weeks “or far longer” regional analysts are grappling with what the conflict means for global power dynamics, Southeast Asian economies and the cohesion of ASEAN itself.
For Dr James Gomez, Director of the Asia Centre, the answer is clear: this is not a crisis that will pass quickly. In an exclusive interview with TNS News, Dr Gomez outlined the conflict’s broader structural implications – from Beijing’s strategic exposure to the narrowing diplomatic space for ASEAN states that have long relied on strategic ambiguity.
His assessment comes as energy markets endure one of the most volatile weeks in recent years. QatarEnergy, the world’s largest LNG producer, has halted operations after Iranian drone strikes on its Ras Laffan and Mesaieed facilities, sending European gas prices up nearly 50 per cent and Asian LNG prices rising close to 39 per cent. Oil prices have climbed above US$82 a barrel, while commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supply normally passes has been severely disrupted.
A War Embedded in Structural Confrontation
Asked whether the US–Iran escalation represents a contained military episode or something deeper, Dr Gomez was unequivocal.
“This is not a contained military episode but an escalation embedded in an ongoing cycle of confrontation. What is significant is the US willingness to engage in direct, overt military action, said Dr Gomez.
He was careful, however, to distinguish between military escalation and a fundamental shift in US doctrine.
“That said, it does not represent a wholesale shift in US foreign policy doctrine. US-led alliances and its regional objectives remain broadly consistent with past behaviour.”
On the broader geopolitical implications, Dr Gomez argued the conflict is accelerating a trend already underway.
“It accelerates fragmentation by the use of military power. In the long run, this forces states not directly involved in the conflict to clarify alignments rather than indefinitely maintaining ambiguity particularly on security and energy routes.”
The pressure, he said, will fall most heavily on states that have benefited from strategic hedging.
“The pressure is less about immediate decoupling and more about narrowing diplomatic room for hedging, especially for small and middle powers.”
ASEAN: Unity Frayed, Centrality Eroded
The crisis has exposed existing fault lines within ASEAN, according to Dr Gomez, with member states responding to the conflict in markedly different ways.
Malaysia, he noted, issued a relatively strong rebuke condemning the escalation, while several other governments adopted far more cautious language.
“ASEAN’s unity will be frayed by uneven national responses as a result of differing sensitivities toward US-led military action and Middle East politics.”
He added that such divergence makes meaningful collective action difficult.
“This divergence makes coordinated responses challenging, leaving ASEAN collective action largely confined to minimal consensus positions such as calls for civilian protection, de-escalation and diplomatic solutions.”
On the broader question of ASEAN centrality, Dr Gomez was frank.
“The tensions from this renewed Middle East conflict add to the continuing irrelevance of ASEAN centrality, though the effect is incremental rather than dramatic.”
He pointed to growing uncertainty around US trade policy, tariffs and alliance commitments as further complicating regional alignment decisions.
Still, he emphasised that ASEAN states are unlikely to align exclusively with any one major power.
“This is not binary. Most ASEAN states will continue playing multiple sides simultaneously to preserve flexibility.”
Looking ahead, Dr Gomez was sceptical about the prospects for coherent ASEAN-level responses.
“At this time one cannot advise and expect ASEAN to accept unity-preserving advice. Priority is likely to be subsumed by realpolitik-driven behaviours.”
Instead, national interests will dominate.
“What we will see manifested will be the pursuit of national priority as opposed to an ASEAN priority. If there is an agreed ASEAN statement, it will likely remain in diplomatic language.”
Within the bloc, he suggested Indonesia will be a country to watch, particularly if President Prabowo Subianto attempts to position Jakarta as a mediator.
China: Economically Exposed, Diplomatically Constrained
Dr Gomez described China’s position in the conflict as both economically exposed and diplomatically constrained.
“China is highly exposed through energy dependence, particularly oil shipments transiting the Strait of Hormuz, where any disruption would raise import costs and inflationary pressure.”
But the vulnerability goes beyond energy flows.
“Beyond energy, the crisis exposes a strategic vulnerability. China has invested heavily in multilateral engagement through institutions such as the United Nations, but unilateral US military action sharply reduces the relevance of those channels.”
As a result, Beijing’s ability to influence the immediate trajectory of events may be limited.
“This constrains Beijing’s ability to shape outcomes, leaving it economically vulnerable and diplomatically sidelined rather than influential.”
China may still attempt to position itself as a voice for restraint.
“Beijing will likely position itself diplomatically as a voice for de-escalation and restraint, appearing to play a mediating role.”
However, Dr Gomez cautioned that the scale of US military operations will affect how credible that role appears.
“The scale, sharpness and effectiveness of US direct attacks will affect Beijing’s ability to play the role of mediator, as it cannot match — or does not want to go as far as the US is willing to go militarily.”
For Beijing, the strategic question may ultimately lie elsewhere.
“China will be watching closely whether the US remains strategically focused on East and Southeast Asia. That will determine China’s next clear actions.”
Southeast Asian Economies: A Convergence of Risks
For Southeast Asia, the conflict presents a convergence of economic risks.
“The immediate risks are inflation from higher energy and transport costs, alongside fiscal strain from expanded fuel subsidies.”
Energy-importing economies face the greatest exposure, while manufacturing exporters risk losing competitiveness as input costs rise.
“Higher import bills would also weaken currencies,” Dr Gomez said.
Those pressures are already emerging. Oil prices have surged sharply since the conflict began, and disruptions to LNG production have tightened global gas markets, creating ripple effects across energy-dependent economies.
Beyond price effects, Dr Gomez highlighted a longer-term strategic dimension.
“Supply disruption would force reliance on alternative suppliers such as Russia, Australia and the US under weaker bargaining conditions, reducing energy autonomy.”
Persistently high fossil-fuel prices could also reshape regional industrial policy.
“Over time, higher fuel prices may accelerate uptake of Chinese electric vehicles and infrastructure, potentially pressuring governments to ease protectionist barriers.”
Fiscal capacity will determine which economies cope best.
“Countries that have the resources to provide energy subsidies to their citizens and residents are likely to fare better than those who cannot.”
An analytical overview of Dr. James Gomez’s warnings regarding the Iran–US conflict. The infographic illustrates the erosion of ASEAN centrality, China’s strategic energy vulnerabilities, and the convergence of economic risks—including inflation and supply chain disruptions—facing Southeast Asian nations as the global order is reshaped.
Governance at Risk
Dr Gomez also warned that prolonged geopolitical instability could have consequences for domestic governance across the region.
“Prolonged instability is likely to normalise more militarised and security-centric responses, especially as great powers themselves prioritise force over diplomacy.”
This shift could narrow civic space.
“This shrinks space for civic action, with peace advocacy and transnational solidarity more easily framed as destabilising or disloyal.”
Economic pressures could reinforce those political dynamics.
“Sustained inflation and supply shocks can fuel nationalist, populist and protectionist policies as governments prioritise domestic buffers over openness and reform.”
The Most Concerning Scenario
Asked what scenario worries him most if the conflict escalates further, Dr Gomez pointed to the interaction between energy disruption and geopolitical miscalculation.
“The most concerning scenario is a prolonged disruption of Gulf energy flows combined with miscalculations that draw in additional external powers” said Dr Gomez.
A full regional war is not required to destabilise the global economy.
“Even limited escalation would globalise the conflict economically, hitting energy prices, shipping insurance and supply chains simultaneously.”
Whether the conflict remains a severe geopolitical shock or evolves into a structural rupture for the global economy will depend largely on the stability of Gulf energy flows in the weeks ahead.
For Southeast Asia, however, the consequences are already unfolding through higher energy costs, tightening fiscal space and a geopolitical environment that offers far less room for diplomatic neutrality. – TNS NEWS
The Asia Centre is an independent research organisation focused on democracy, rights and governance in Asia. Dr James Gomez is its Director.
This interview was conducted by TNS News on March 2, 2026 as part of ongoing coverage of the US-Iran conflict and its regional implications.